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Abstract
By using data from all available waves of the IMF Coordinated Portfolio In-
vestment Surveys, we explore the dynamics of the determinants of cross portfolio
investments. The main aim of our analysis, however, is to understand whether a
diversification motive can also be found, among the various determinants. We find
strong evidence that, indeed, the correlation between the idiosyncratic components
of gdp growth, as well as the correlation between stock returns between pair of coun-
tries, that we consider as proxies for diversification, are relevant to explain bilateral
portfolio holdings, when unobserved heterogeneity is properly taken into account,
by means of a fixed effect, panel estimation (where the fixed effects refer to pair of
countries, rather than countries in isolation). Interestingly, the same results, cannot
be retrieved from cross section estimations. It also turns out that the diversification
motive is less relevant, if at all, in choosing whether or not to invest in a particular
area.
Keywords: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, risk sharing, gravity models
JEL codes: F210, F150, F410
1 Introduction
The objective of this work is to explore the risk sharing role of cross country portfolio
allocations. Applying a gravity model as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) on data from
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys by the IMF (which reports total bilateral port-
folio investment assets), we investigate on whether investment decisions of source countries
are inspired, among the others, by risk sharing objectives. It is often claimed that the
recent surge in globalization opens up new and large opportunities for international risk
sharing. The idea is that under the hypothesis of complete markets (perfect risk sharing)
agents should invest in foreign countries with a negatively correlated business cycles, or in
those countries whose business cycles differ in volatility1. That this may or may not have
occurred is a largely empirical matter, and evidence is far from unambiguous. Moreover,
there are two, equally interesting facets to this matter. On the one hand, if countries were
willing to reap all the potential benefits from financial globalization, we would expect a
negative reaction of bilateral equity holdings with respect to correlations between partner
countries’ idiosyncratic components of GDP. In order to diversify risk, agents within a
country should invest in partner countries whose idiosyncratic GDP are negatively cor-
related with national innovations to income, which would provide the investing country
with insurance against idiosyncratic risk. Secondly, even if this were the case, it should
still be checked whether or not cross-ownership of assets did bring about the desired level
of income smoothing. In this work we focus on the first of the two questions, and try to
understand whether or not countries invest more in other countries’ assets, the less corre-
lated their business cycle is with the partner economy. This empirical question was also
dealt with in a recent paper by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), where the authors analyze
cross equity portfolio ownerships in the context of a gravitational model. By inserting in
the gravity model such explanatory variables as the correlation in economies’ growth rates,
stock returns and growth rates and stock returns, they show that bilateral cross country
holdings do not seem to be driven by diversification purposes. In order to more thoroughly
explore this issue, we extend the seminal work by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) along
several dimensions. On the one hand, we use all the available waves of the Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey to perform a repeated cross section analysis, in search for time
changes in the determinants of cross ownership positions. On the other hand, we use the
available data to build a panel dataset, which helps in controlling for individual (i.e. pair
of countries) unobserved heterogeneity, which might be not easily accounted for otherwise,
and lead to possibly different results. That this is indeed the case will be clearly seen in
section 5, where the main empirical findings will be discussed. Moreover, the explanatory
variable we use to identify diversification determinants of cross ownership positions is quite
original, and comes from the decomposition of GDP growth rates in an idiosyncratic and
an aggregate component, by means of a simple regression technique. The correlation in
the idiosyncratic components of gdp growth will be used, along with other, more standard,
1Even though business cycles were perfectly synchronized is still possible to pool risk exploiting the
different volatility of the business cycles
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variables, to shed light on this issue. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 frames our empirical question into the current literature, while section 3 and 4 present
the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the main empirical findings,
while section 6 contains some final comments. The detailed description of the variables
used in the empirical analyses is relegated to an Appendix.
2 Literature review
The issue of portfolio equity investments has been dealt with, from a theoretical standpoint,
from a number of perspectives: financial market incompleteness, transactional frictions in
asset markets, and frictions in goods markets. All of these perspectives have in common
the fact that the mutual fund separation theorem does not hold, and that one normally
sees a certain amount of home bias in domestic portfolio positions. In addition, all of these
theoretical models provide some insight for the construction of empirical models of equity
portfolio investments. Previous empirical work has dealt with the geography of investment
flows, but always with some specific limits dictated by data availability. In particular, most
contributions have studied the investment positions of a single country (most often, the
United States), or of very few countries. In general, most such contributions have made use
of gravity models, of the kind used in international trade analysis, to analyze foreign direct
investments and banking flows. For example, Wei (2000) and Stein and Daude (2007) have
analyzed the geography of FDI, while Buch (2002) and Rose and Spiegel (2004) have con-
centrated on bank lending and borrowing. In all these papers the role of bilateral trade as
a driver of investment and the role of bank lending have been singled out. There has also
been a number of studies concentrating upon bilateral equity investments, such as Portes
and Rey (2005), Ahearne et al. (2004), Dahlquist et al. (2003), Yildrim (2003), mostly deal-
ing with the case of United States, and with the issue of portfolio home bias. A remarkable
exception in the literature, and a seminal paper which constitutes the benchmark for our
research is the work by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) (LMF, in the sequel). This work is
particularly relevant, as it covers a large number of source and host countries, using data
from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), run by the International Mone-
tary Fund. In particular, the authors use data from the second CPIS, relating to 2001, and
featuring data from 67 source and 218 host countries. The analysis of LMF departs from
earlier contributions in several noticeable ways: by resorting to a very wide pool of source
and host countries, it can provide a better identification of the potential determinants of
portfolio equity investments; by developing a double fixed effects empirical specification,
which consists in adding to the empirical model two sets of country dummies, respectively
for source and host countries, which help in isolating the relative contribution of bilateral
factors, source country factors and host country factors. In fact, by suitably controlling for
source country and host country effects, the role of bilateral factors can be more properly
identified. Among the other factors whose relevance was tested in their empirical work, a
diversification motive was included, but the corresponding results were inconclusive. Risk
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sharing and home bias (and consequently portfolio investments) have recently been linked
in the papers by Lewis (1999), and by Sorensen et al. (2007). Absence of international
portfolio diversification and (international) risk sharing may be closely linked, as agents
who diversify their portfolios internationally are more likely to obtain smoother income
and consumption. Sorensen et al. (2007) find that home bias decreases while risk sharing
increases during the 1990s. They measure risk sharing as the distance of consumption
growth from a situation of perfect markets (perfect consumption risk sharing), and pro-
vide a measure of risk sharing income. Both these measures show improvements, which
would hint at a robust and positive correlation between level of foreign portfolio assets and
income risk sharing, and between foreign direct investment (FDI) and consumption risk
sharing. This issue is obviously linked to another very ”hot” topic in the recent literature:
whether or not the surge in financial liberalization that occurred in the last two decades
has effectively improved on the risk sharing opportunities available to the economies in-
volved. The economic literature is rather divided on this issue, and the empirical evidence
is quite mixed. For example, Giannone and Reichlin (2006) register an increase in risk
sharing among European countries from the early 1990s when market integration signifi-
cantly accelerated. They also warn, however, that estimates on selected subsamples may
be affected by the subsample choice itself. Kose et al. (2008) find very weak links between
financial globalization and risk sharing, over the period 1960-2004, and for the two subsam-
ples 1960-1986 (pre-globalization) and 1987-2004 (globalization). In particular, they find
that if globalization does not seem to have exerted any significant impact on risk sharing
for the whole sample of countries and the whole period, it has played a negative impact on
risk sharing for emerging economies. However, on the shorter globalization sample, only
developed countries seem to have reaped some benefits from financial globalization in term
of risk sharing, whereas the subset of emerging economies does not seem to have been
affected, at least in a statistically significant way. On the other hand, Kose et al. (2006)
noticed that financial openness, as measured by gross capital flows as a ratio to GDP, is
associated with an increase in the ratio of consumption volatility to income volatility, con-
trary to the notions of improved international risk-sharing opportunities through financial
integration. Kaminsky et al. (2005) investigate over the relationship of net income flows
and GDP, and find that net capital flows are procyclical in most OECD and developing
countries, i.e. countries tend to borrow in good times and repay in bad times. On the
other hand, Bai and Zhang (2004) conduct a regression analysis (both panel and cross
section) dividing their whole sample (1973-1998) in two distinct sub-samples (1973-1985;
1986-1998) and conducting separate tests for 19 developed countries, for 21 developing
countries and for the whole set of countries. Their study shows that, although the degree
of financial integration doubles from the first to the second sub-period, there is no substan-
tial improvement in international risk sharing. Moreover, they claim that international risk
sharing is not sensitive to the increase in financial integration. That the need or possibility
for diversification of idiosyncratic risks may also be a determinant for bilateral portfolio
positions has surfaced in other recent contributions, but only very few have attempted to
perform an empirical verification. An interesting work, in this field, is that by Bracke and
Schmitz (2008), trying to understand whether equity portfolio investments play a role in
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consumption risk sharing both via net investment income and via capital gains. To do so,
they analyze a dataset comprising 35 industrial and emerging market economies. In this
paper, as anticipated in the introduction, we intend to take one step forward, to explicitly
introduce a proxy for the diversification motive in a gravity model for bilateral portfolio
investments.
3 Data
Data on bilateral equity holdings for years 2001 up to 2009 come from several waves of
the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). For comparative purposes we included 67 source2 countries and 218 host countries3
as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). Original data are expressed in current US dollars.
As we are interested in the real dynamics of cross country holdings (actual purchases or
sales of assets over time), and since the overall dynamics in the value of asset holdings may
also originate from a different valuation of the same positions (both because of changes in
asset prices and in relative exchange rates), we had to compensate for the latter source
of changes. Therefore, in order to run bona fide longitudinal analyses, data on equity
holdings have been deflated by using a Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) price
index (period average, base year 2001). Likewise, the value of equity holdings of each
given country has been adjusted to account for exchange rate fluctuations by using an
index number of bilateral exchange rate between US dollars and the currency of the host
country (base year 2001). Analogously, bilateral trade across countries has been adjusted
for exchange rate fluctuations. As a result of all these adjustments, equity values are
expressed in 2001 current US dollars, at 2001 stock prices. Covariates have been computed
following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).4
4 Descriptive Statistics
In tables 1, 2 and 3 we report percentage shares and the growth rates of bilateral equity
asset holdings (unweighted and weighted5) aggregating over 6 major areas. Data are, as
explained in the previous section, in “constant, 2001, terms” since they are adjusted for
exchange rate fluctuations and for valuation effects. Off shore centers have been removed,
to avoid distortions. Thus, statistics in table 1, 2 and 3 refer to the dependent variable
entering our regression analysis. Over the period 2001-2009 the weight of OECD countries
is still dominant, since around 74 percent of the total amount of equity asset holding is
due to U.S., UK and Euro Area; however, their role is becoming less important over the
2See appendix A for a complete list of source and host countries included in the analysis.
3Source refers to countries undertaking an investment, i.e. purchasing equities in a foreign country,
while hosts refers to countries receiving the investment.
4For a detailed description of data see appendix B
5By period average shares.
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observed period of time. In particular, the U.S. and the Euro Area lost respectively about
5 and 2.5 percent of their shares, while UK lost just 0.9 percent. On the contrary, Japan
gained one percentage point, other OECD countries and Emerging markets registered a
remarkable increase of their weight of around 4 percent. A quick look at unweighted
rates of growth of equity asset holdings reveals how Emerging markets quadrupled their
international portfolio size, “other OECD countries” and Japan doubled, whereas U.S.,
UK and the Euro Area have been growing below the average, increasing their equity assets
positions by around 50 percent. If we now look at weighted rates of growth (by the
corresponding percentage shares of the total, reported in table 3), about half of the increase
in total investment can be attributed to emerging markets and to “other OECD countries”.
To sum up, total growth of equity asset holdings amounts to 76.2 percent and the increasing
role of emerging economies and the attractiveness of U.S. and European markets for these
countries become quite evident. Moreover, the persistence of bilateral investment patterns
decreased somehow over the whole time horizon in comparison to what detected by Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) between 2001 and 2005.6It seems fair to say that, looking at
data, there is some evidence of an ongoing change of the international investment patterns,
calling for a further investigation over the entire available time horizon.
5 Empirical findings
This section describes the results for cross-section and panel analyses. Cross section anal-
yses have been conducted, as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), controlling for countries’
characteristics by the inclusion of “double fixed effects” for source and host countries,
whereas our panel analysis includes individual fixed effects for each pair of source-host
countries, which is less restrictive and allows controlling for specific “pair” effects. The
combination of any two countries, in fact, might be influenced by a fixed factor which is
potentially different from the combination of the two individual countries effects. Following
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), the estimated model for cross section analyses is:
log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij (1)
where xij is the equity investment of country i in country j; Zij is a vector of covariates;
φi and φj are dummy variables for source and host countries, respectively. This model
includes a dummy variable for each source and each host country, so that the constant is
given by the sum of φi and φj, capturing individual heterogeneity of countries i and j. The
strength and the novelty of this approach is that it allows exploiting the bilateral dimension
of the data to take into account nationals’ characteristics. However, once we have several
cross sections, corresponding to various time periods, the time dimension can also be used,
allowing for the inclusion of proper individual fixed effects, where by individuals we mean
source-host pairs of countries. The inclusion of “pairs fixed effects” allows to capture
6If one regresses, as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), the log of equity positions in 2001 on the log of
equity positions in 2005, one obtains an elasticity of 0.84, while the same exercise between 2001 and 2009
yields an elasticity of about 0.73.
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that heterogeneity which characterizes any bilateral portfolio equity allocations. This is
more general than in the cross section estimation, imposing each country’s fixed effect to
be identical irrespective of the partner country (host or source). In terms of number of
dummy variables to be estimated, in the more restrictive model a total of i+j individual
dummies is to be estimated, while in the panel estimation i · j individual fixed effects
are included. Therefore, for the panel analysis we adopt the following fixed effects model
specification:
log(xijt) = φij + νt + βZijt + ijt (2)
where φij are individual intercepts and νt are time fixed effects.
5.1 Cross section analysis
For comparative purposes, the first step of our analysis consists in replicating the empirical
evidence offered by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) for the year 2001 and its extension for
the whole available sampling period, i.e. 2002-2009, in order to assess possible changes
over time in the determinants of international asset allocation choices of responding coun-
tries (results available upon request). The estimation results, presented in tables (5-13)
essentially confirm those presented in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008): throughout the
years, bilateral trade is the single most important explanatory variable of cross country
portfolio holdings, though its relevance is much weakened in the Tobit estimation. Other
variables proxying for information asymmetries and socio cultural proximity are more or
less significant in explaining portfolio holdings, over the years: the logarithm of distance,
of time difference, and various dummies for common language, ex colonial past, for being
party in a tax treaty, or in a currency union. The variables used to identify a diversi-
fication motive for portfolio cross holdings are often significant, but with the “wrong”,
positive, sign. Their estimated coefficients seem to indicate that agents hold portfolios in
countries which are rather similar, in terms of business cycle dynamics and stock markets.
We also introduced some additional explanatory variables. in particular, we replaced the
variable expressing the correlation between gdp growths with a different one, containing
the correlation among the idiosyncratic components of gdp growth. Details about the com-
putation of this variable can be found in the data appendix. The estimated coefficient of
this variable is also positive, and does not bring new elements into the picture. One more
explanatory variable is worth mentioning, the overall score of freedom in the host country,
produced by The Heritage Foundation7. It always enters with a positive and significant
coefficient across all estimation periods for the full sample and the OECD set, while it
gains importance and significance for emerging economies as we move towards the end of
the time horizon (2009, though, seems to be an exception). Tables (13)-(15) give an idea
of the variability across years of estimated coefficients of just one particular specification of
equation (1), namely the specification reported in columns (1) of tables (4)-(12); a cursory
reading of these tables show that, for the whole sample of countries, the coefficients of
the most important explanatory variable, bilateral trade, increases in magnitude over the
7http://www.heritage.org/
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whole sample, though non monotonically. The relevance of the other significant variables,
i.e. time difference, common language, colonial past, common legal origin and the overall
score of freedom in the host country, significantly varies across periods, but at the end of
the time horizon is not very different from what it was at the beginning. As for the OECD
countries, the relevance of the bilateral trade has an opposite behavior (i.e. decreases over
time). The estimated models for the emerging countries are the ones yielding the less
satisfactory results, with many explanatory variables being only occasionally significant.
5.2 Panel analysis
As a first empirical exercise, we pool all our cross-section data in a single dataset, applying
the “pair” fixed effect structure of equation (2). The results of this estimation, contained
in tables 15-20, confirm the relevance of the variables already included in the single cross
sections, but reveal something new, in that one of the variables used to proxy the diversi-
fication motive, i.e. the correlation in stock returns, becomes now negatively and strongly
significant, at least in the linear specification. The estimation results change even more as
we move to a proper panel estimation. As is well known, in the context of panel estima-
tions it is possible to properly assess the relevance of fixed effects, i.e. the impact of factors
which are peculiar to the individual observations. In our case each observation concerns
a pair (source-host) of countries, and the fixed effect refers to some factor which plays
a role for this couple, but not necessarily for each economy in isolation. Therefore, any
fixed effect is likely to capture the (possibly stable) effect of variables which are relevant
for the interaction of those economies, and which cannot be observed or are difficult to
quantify. It is highly plausible that such unaccounted for factors be somehow correlated
with our proxies for diversification motives (correlations between stock market returns, or
correlation between idiosyncratic components of gdp). This unobserved factors may then
have an impact on the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients of the latter, if
the former become part of the disturbance term, as is likely to be the case in purely cross
sectional estimations. As already hinted at above, simple source and host country effects,
which were included in the cross sectional estimations, may not adequately account for such
factors. We report in tables (16) panel estimates over the period 2001-2009 for the whole
sample and the two subsamples (OECD countries and Emerging economies) according to
two different specifications: log levels and growth rates (table (16)). We may immediately
observe that, as this specification includes both period and cross section fixed effects, all
the variables not (sufficiently) changing over time cannot be included, their effect being
somehow summarized in the cross section fixed effects. While the effect of bilateral trade is
almost always strong and positive, our original research question receives a more clear cut
answer. In almost all model specifications both the correlation between the idiosyncratic
components of GDP and the correlation in stock returns turned out to be significantly
negative. Interestingly, even in the face of a positive correlation between the two variables,
they are both significant, suggesting that the comovements between the idiosyncratic com-
ponents of GDP are significant even if one controls for the correlation between stock returns
in two economies. This is true both for the linear specifications and for the non linear,
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Tobit specification (but only for the correlation in the idiosyncratic components of GDP).
When we look at the results for the two sub samples, however, the diversification motive
is supported by the linear specification, but not by the Tobit model. This suggests that
the decision to engage in portfolio investments, and that of investing more or less, might
have different determinants relative to the sub samples. In particular, it seems that the
former depends more on the closeness and similarity of the pair of economies, although
it may well be the case that once the decision to open a position in a country is taken,
the investment size may also be determined by diversification motives. This is confirmed
by the regression results of the probit models, where the diversification variables, and in
particular the correlation in stock returns, has a positive and significant coefficient. The
opposite situation we get with the tax treaty variable. The fact that a pair of countries are
taking part in a tax treaty appears to be significant in determining the choice of investing,
but not to have an impact upon the relative dimension of portfolio investments. Bilateral
trade is always positive and highly significant in driving international investment portfo-
lio choices. Finally, the overall level of freedom in the host country is always positively
significant, as it used to be in the cross section and pooled cross section estimations.
6 Conclusions
The recent surge in financial globalization opened up many investment opportunities for
the countries involved. One possible outcome of this process is an increase in portfolio
diversification, if bilateral holdings are also driven by diversification motives. Whether
or not this has been the case is the research question addressed in this paper, where we
extend the analysis proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) to all available waves of
the IMF Coordinated Investment Portfolio Survey; this question is addressed by means of
both cross section and panel methodologies. The main empirical result of our analysis is
that, indeed, a diversification motive emerges from the data, which mainly concerns the
relative size of portfolio holdings. It also turns out, however, that the decision to open
portfolio positions in a country depends more on symmetries, rather than differences, in
the two countries’ cycles.
7 Appendix A
List of source countries excluding off shore centers:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Ko-
rea (Republic of), Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela.
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List of host countries excluding off shore centers:
Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azer-
baijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, France,
French Guiana, French Polynesia, French Southern Territories, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Greenland, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (Democratic People’s Re-
public of), Korea (Republic of), Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania,
Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Por-
tugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, San Marino, Sa˜o Tome`
and Pr`ıncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Helena, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, United States Minor Outlying
Islands, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vatican City State, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands
(United States), Wallis and Futuna Islands, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
8 Appendix B
Bilateral portfolio equity holdings:
millions of U.S. dollar of portfolio equity holdings issued by host countries and held by
source country. Source 2001-2009 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Bilateral trade:
five-year backward looking moving average of imports plus exports over the period 2001-
2009. Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database.
Colony Dummy:
dummy taking the value 1 if source and host country ever had a colonial relationship and
zero otherwise. Source Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Common Language:
dummy variable taking value 1 if host and source countries share the same language and
zero otherwise. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
Common Legal Origin:
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dummy variable taking the value 1 if the source and and host countries have a legal system
with a common origin (common law, French, German or Scandinavian) and 0 otherwise.
Source: La Porta et al. (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
Correlation between growth-stock returns:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between annual GDP growth
rates in the source country and real stock returns in the host country over the period 2001-
2009. For the IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average has
been restricted to just ten years. Source: authors’ calculation based on Morgan Stanley
Capital International (Datastream) and World Bank (on-line database World Development
Indicators).
Correlation in GDP growth rates:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between the annual GDP
growth rate of source and host countries over the period 2001-2009. For the IV estimation
the aforementioned backward looking moving average has been restricted to just ten years.
Source: authors’ calculation based on World Bank (on-line database: World Development
Indicators).
Correlation in idiosyncratic GDP:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between the annual idiosyn-
cratic GDP growth rate of source and host countries over the period 2001-2009. For the
IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average has been restricted
to just ten years. The idiosyncratic component of GDP growth is computed as the esti-
mated residuals of the following regression ∆ log(GDPit) = β∆ log(GDPat) + it. Where
∆ log(GDPit) is the country i GDP rate of growth and ∆ log(GDPat) represents the aver-
age rate of growth of the reference group (in our case: all countries; OECD countries and
Emerging Markets). The GDP growth rate of a given country is therefore decomposed in
two orthogonal components: in fact, ∆ log(GDPit) = β̂∆ log(GDPat) + eit, thus the id-
iosyncratic GDP growth will be orthogonal to the aggregate (group average) GDP growth
by construction: eit⊥β̂∆ log(GDPat). The more standard practice (e.g. Asdrubali et al.
(1996)) consists in simply subtracting the group average GDP growth to each country’ s
GDP rate of growth. However, this practice does not guarantee orthogonality between
aggregate and idiosyncratic GDP growth and may generate serious omitted variable bias
if one of the regressors strongly correlates with the aggregate GDP growth. Moreover the
standard decomposition restricts the coefficient attached to aggregate GDP to be equal to
1, while the empirical evidence contradicts this assumption.
Correlation in stock returns:
eleven-year backward looking moving average correlation between the monthly stock mar-
ket returns of the host and source country, expressed in U.S. dollars over the period 2001-
2009. For the IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average has
been restricted to just five years. Source: authors’ calculations based on returns data from
Morgan Stanley Capital International (Datastream).
Currency Union Dummy:
dummy variable taking value 1 if source and host countries are in a currency union and
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zero otherwise. Source Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Rose and Spiegel (2004)
Log distance:
logarithm of Great Circle distance in miles between the capital cities of source and host
country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Overall score of freedom in the host country:
overall freedom score ranging from zero to 100 given by the average of ten component
scores: business freedom; trade freedom; fiscal freedom; Government spending; monetary
freedom; investment freedom; financial freedom; property rights; freedom from corruption;
labour freedom. All 10 components are weighted equally. Source The Heritage Foundation
(http://www.heritage.org/)
Tax Treaty:
dummy variable taking value 1 if source and host countries enacted a double taxation agree-
ment prior to 1999. Agreements considered are: Capital, Income and Capital, Income and
Inheritance. Double taxation agreements on Air, Land and Sea Transport have been ex-
cluded. Source: Authors’ elaborations on DTT (Double Taxation Treaties) database from
www.unctad.org.
Time Difference:
absolute value of of time difference between host and source country (from 1 to 12). Source:
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Rose and Spiegel (2004)
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Table 1: International Equity Asset Holdings
(% shares over the year-total)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001-2009
United States 0.0 7.3 9.4 5.7 5.4 5.5 33.4
United Kingdom 4.7 0.0 3.7 1.6 1.0 1.4 12.5
Euro area 9.2 3.8 9.9 1.5 1.7 1.1 27.3
Japan 3.5 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.3 5.6
Other OECD Countries 8.9 1.8 3.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 16.7
Emerging markets 1.4 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.2 4.5
Total 27.8 14.7 27.3 10.3 9.6 10.3 100.0
2001
United States - 8.8 11.5 4.3 6.2 5.0 35.7
United Kingdom 3.2 - 5.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 12.9
Euro area 8.1 4.2 11.2 1.1 2.2 1.1 27.9
Japan 3.1 0.7 0.9 - 0.4 0.2 5.3
Other OECD Countries 7.2 1.8 3.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 15.2
Emerging markets 0.8 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 3.0
Total 22.4 16.6 32.9 7.7 11.3 9.1 100.0
2002
United States - 8.2 10.6 4.9 6.1 4.7 34.5
United Kingdom 4.0 - 4.4 1.6 1.5 1.4 12.8
Euro area 8.2 4.5 11.2 1.3 2.2 0.9 28.3
Japan 3.2 0.7 0.9 - 0.4 0.2 5.4
Other OECD Countries 7.8 1.9 3.3 1.1 1.1 0.6 15.8
Emerging markets 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.7 3.1
Total 24.0 16.4 30.7 9.0 11.4 8.4 100.0
2003
United States - 8.1 10.0 5.6 5.9 5.6 35.3
United Kingdom 3.9 - 3.6 1.6 1.0 1.5 11.5
Euro area 9.1 4.1 11.3 1.6 1.9 1.2 29.0
Japan 3.2 0.6 0.8 - 0.3 0.2 5.2
Other OECD Countries 7.9 1.8 3.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 15.8
Emerging Countries 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8 3.2
Total 24.9 15.7 29.3 10.0 10.2 10.0 100.0
2004
United States - 6.8 10.1 5.6 5.5 5.5 33.4
United Kingdom 4.5 - 4.2 1.6 0.8 1.6 12.7
Euro area 9.6 3.7 11.0 1.7 1.7 1.1 28.8
Japan 3.7 0.7 0.8 - 0.4 0.3 5.8
Other OECD Countries 8.4 1.6 3.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 15.8
Emerging markets 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 3.6
Total 27.1 14.0 29.4 10.2 9.3 10.0 100.0
2005
United States - 6.7 9.3 7.3 5.5 5.8 34.7
United Kingdom 5.0 - 3.5 2.1 1.0 1.4 13.1
Euro area 9.4 3.5 9.7 2.0 1.7 1.2 27.4
Japan 3.6 0.5 0.7 - 0.3 0.3 5.4
Other OECD Countries 8.3 1.6 2.8 1.4 0.8 0.6 15.5
Emerging markets 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.1 3.9
Total 27.3 13.5 26.4 13.1 9.3 10.4 100.0
2006
United States - 6.5 9.3 6.2 5.1 6.0 33.1
United Kingdom 5.4 - 3.3 1.9 0.9 1.4 13.0
Euro area 10.0 3.6 9.9 2.0 1.6 1.3 28.5
Japan 3.4 0.5 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 5.3
Other OECD Countries 8.4 1.6 2.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 15.8
Emerging markets 1.4 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.5 4.3
Total 28.7 13.1 26.4 11.5 8.9 11.4 100.0
2007
United States - 6.0 9.0 6.5 5.1 6.3 32.9
United Kingdom 5.4 - 2.8 1.8 0.8 1.5 12.4
Euro area 9.8 3.2 8.5 1.8 1.5 1.4 26.1
Japan 3.3 0.4 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 5.2
Other OECD Countries 9.9 1.6 3.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 17.8
Emerging markets 1.9 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.8 5.6
Total 30.4 12.1 24.4 11.9 8.8 12.4 100.0
2008
United States - 6.4 7.9 6.8 4.7 5.0 30.8
United Kingdom 5.9 - 2.9 1.6 0.7 1.2 12.2
Euro area 10.1 3.4 8.1 0.9 1.4 0.8 24.7
Japan 4.2 0.6 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 6.2
Other OECD Countries 11.3 2.0 2.9 1.5 1.0 0.8 19.5
Emerging markets 2.5 1.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 1.7 6.6
Total 34.0 13.8 22.8 11.3 8.2 9.8 100.0
2009
United States - 8.2 7.4 4.3 4.9 5.8 30.6
United Kingdom 5.3 - 3.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 12.0
Euro area 8.9 3.9 8.4 0.9 1.3 1.3 24.7
Japan 4.1 0.7 0.7 - 0.4 0.4 6.3
Other OECD Countries 10.5 2.6 3.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 19.5
Emerging markets 2.4 2.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 1.4 6.9
Total 31.3 17.5 23.4 7.9 9.0 11.0 100.0
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Table 2: International Equity Asset Holdings
(annual % changes unweighted)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001/2009, total change
United States - 65.5 12.6 76.7 40.1 103.8 50.8
United Kingdom 189.5 - -3.2 70.3 41.8 58.3 63.8
Euro area 95.5 63.8 32.2 44.9 1.4 93.3 55.8
Japan 132.7 68.1 51.9 - 82.2 228.4 110.9
Other OECD Countries 155.7 152.8 57.0 115.7 108.5 130.8 125.8
Emerging markets 430.2 234.0 421.7 385.9 107.7 274.2 312.3
Total 145.6 85.4 25.2 79.6 40.8 113.5 76.2
2001/2002
United States - -4.7 -6.1 17.3 1.4 -4.3 -1.4
United Kingdom 25.5 - -19.6 21.8 8.6 3.4 1.4
Euro area 3.8 8.7 2.4 18.1 1.1 -21.2 3.3
Japan 6.3 -0.2 2.4 - 5.9 -8.1 4.1
Other OECD Countries 10.3 6.6 -5.6 21.8 7.4 -8.4 5.8
Emerging markets -4.8 6.2 53.7 42.4 1.5 1.9 7.1
Total 9.1 0.8 -4.8 19.0 2.9 -5.3 1.9
2002/2003
United States - 32.6 27.5 53.4 30.4 60.9 37.4
United Kingdom 32.6 - 7.6 33.7 -9.9 47.0 20.7
Euro area 49.2 21.2 35.8 59.7 12.8 77.7 38.0
Japan 34.4 17.5 20.4 - 15.5 59.5 29.5
Other OECD Countries 35.4 26.0 37.2 40.2 19.1 55.3 34.6
Emerging markets 40.3 36.2 10.2 45.0 1.0 59.0 38.5
Total 39.7 28.3 28.3 49.2 19.9 59.8 34.6
2003/2004
United States - -22.8 -7.9 -8.0 -15.1 -10.1 -12.9
United Kingdom 5.0 - 8.3 -7.3 -25.7 0.6 1.1
Euro area -3.2 -15.4 -10.6 0.7 -14.6 -13.7 -8.7
Japan 5.6 -4.4 -3.7 - 0.1 20.6 3.3
Other OECD Countries -2.6 -15.3 -13.2 -6.4 -17.7 -15.7 -8.0
Emerging markets 16.1 -1.0 -23.3 1.1 -7.3 3.4 2.2
Total 0.0 -17.7 -7.6 -6.2 -15.7 -7.5 -8.0
2004/2005
United States - 5.4 -1.8 39.0 5.7 13.4 10.3
United Kingdom 18.3 - -10.0 43.2 29.5 -6.8 9.6
Euro area 4.4 -0.9 -6.3 26.5 1.8 11.4 1.1
Japan 2.2 -19.9 -2.5 - 0.6 -1.7 -1.2
Other OECD Countries 5.0 5.8 -5.2 28.9 2.2 3.7 4.6
Emerging markets 15.5 3.9 23.5 48.2 -12.1 31.9 17.3
Total 7.0 2.5 -4.8 36.6 6.4 10.5 6.2
2005/2006
United States - 6.9 11.0 -6.8 2.7 14.2 5.7
United Kingdom 20.5 - 3.7 0.1 4.3 10.9 10.4
Euro area 18.1 14.4 13.5 8.7 8.0 25.4 15.0
Japan 7.0 12.5 6.7 - 5.8 41.4 9.2
Other OECD Countries 12.6 10.3 13.3 -0.1 21.6 34.6 12.7
Emerging markets 39.9 -16.4 10.6 -14.3 35.0 48.9 20.3
Total 16.3 7.5 11.1 -2.7 5.8 20.7 10.7
2006/2007
United States - -17.1 -12.8 -4.5 -9.0 -5.5 -10.2
United Kingdom -9.5 - -23.6 -15.3 -19.0 -2.2 -13.8
Euro area -11.6 -20.7 -22.9 -19.0 -17.2 -1.8 -17.1
Japan -12.3 -20.7 -15.4 - -12.8 10.6 -12.0
Other OECD Countries 6.6 -8.5 -4.0 3.3 -6.4 0.8 1.9
Emerging markets 29.8 -5.1 38.3 70.3 53.5 7.8 17.6
Total -4.0 -16.4 -16.5 -6.8 -10.9 -2.0 -9.6
2007/2008
United States - -26.2 -39.8 -28.6 -36.6 -45.3 -35.7
United Kingdom -26.0 - -30.2 -38.6 -38.4 -47.1 -32.2
Euro area -29.1 -25.4 -34.5 -64.2 -37.2 -63.3 -35.1
Japan -13.6 -6.2 -30.0 - -29.6 -42.8 -18.5
Other OECD Countries -21.6 -16.3 -35.1 -24.7 -27.8 -38.5 -24.8
Emerging markets -12.6 4.5 -33.6 -8.0 -28.5 -33.9 -18.3
Total -23.3 -21.6 -35.9 -34.4 -35.6 -45.4 -31.3
2008/2009
United States - 145.9 78.5 21.0 98.9 120.0 89.8
United Kingdom 73.6 - 107.2 51.2 189.9 93.5 87.4
Euro area 68.7 119.3 97.9 91.3 82.1 218.2 91.5
Japan 86.0 123.9 107.8 - 128.0 111.4 95.8
Other OECD Countries 77.6 148.6 108.5 34.7 135.8 122.6 90.8
Emerging markets 86.6 170.9 219.7 17.0 67.7 59.7 100.7
Total 76.0 141.3 96.2 32.8 109.4 113.7 91.2
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Table 3: International Equity Asset Holdings
(annual % changes weighted by the share)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001/2009
United States - 5.7 1.4 3.3 2.5 5.2 18.1
United Kingdom 6.1 - -0.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 8.2
Euro area 7.7 2.7 3.6 0.5 0.0 1.1 15.6
Japan 4.1 0.5 0.4 - 0.3 0.5 5.9
Other OECD Countries 11.3 2.8 2.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 19.1
Emerging Countries 3.5 2.5 1.0 0.4 0.1 1.8 9.3
Total 32.7 14.2 8.3 6.1 4.6 10.3 76.2
2001/2002
United States - -0.4 -0.7 0.7 0.1 -0.2 -0.5
United Kingdom 0.8 - -1.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2
Euro area 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.9
Japan 0.2 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other OECD Countries 0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.9
Emerging Countries 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Total 2.0 0.1 -1.6 1.5 0.3 -0.5 1.9
2002/2003
United States - 2.7 2.9 2.6 1.9 2.9 12.9
United Kingdom 1.3 - 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.6 2.7
Euro area 4.0 1.0 4.0 0.8 0.3 0.7 10.8
Japan 1.1 0.1 0.2 - 0.1 0.1 1.6
Other OECD Countries 2.8 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 5.5
Emerging Countries 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.2
Total 9.5 4.6 8.7 4.4 2.3 5.0 34.6
2003/2004
United States - -1.8 -0.8 -0.4 -0.9 -0.6 -4.5
United Kingdom 0.2 - 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.1
Euro area -0.3 -0.6 -1.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -2.5
Japan 0.2 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other OECD Countries -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1.3
Emerging Countries 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 0.0 -2.8 -2.2 -0.6 -1.6 -0.8 -8.0
2004/2005
United States - 0.4 -0.2 2.2 0.3 0.7 3.4
United Kingdom 0.8 - -0.4 0.7 0.2 -0.1 1.2
Euro area 0.4 0.0 -0.7 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.3
Japan 0.1 -0.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Other OECD Countries 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7
Emerging Countries 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.6
Total 1.9 0.3 -1.4 3.7 0.6 1.1 6.2
2005/2006
United States - 0.5 1.0 -0.5 0.1 0.8 2.0
United Kingdom 1.0 - 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.4
Euro area 1.7 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 4.1
Japan 0.2 0.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.1 0.5
Other OECD Countries 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 2.0
Emerging Countries 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8
Total 4.4 1.0 2.9 -0.4 0.5 2.2 10.7
2006/2007
United States - -1.1 -1.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -3.4
United Kingdom -0.5 - -0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -1.8
Euro area -1.2 -0.7 -2.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -4.9
Japan -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 - 0.0 0.0 -0.6
Other OECD Countries 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3
Emerging Countries 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8
Total -1.1 -2.1 -4.4 -0.8 -1.0 -0.2 -9.6
2007/2008
United States - -1.6 -3.6 -1.9 -1.9 -2.9 -11.7
United Kingdom -1.4 - -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.7 -4.0
Euro area -2.9 -0.8 -2.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.9 -9.2
Japan -0.5 0.0 -0.2 - -0.1 -0.2 -1.0
Other OECD Countries -2.1 -0.3 -1.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -4.4
Emerging Countries -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0
Total -7.1 -2.6 -8.8 -4.1 -3.1 -5.6 -31.3
2008/2009
United States - 9.3 6.2 1.4 4.7 6.0 27.6
United Kingdom 4.3 - 3.1 0.8 1.4 1.1 10.7
Euro area 7.0 4.1 7.9 0.9 1.1 1.7 22.6
Japan 3.6 0.7 0.7 - 0.4 0.4 5.9
Other OECD Countries 8.8 3.0 3.1 0.5 1.3 1.0 17.7
Emerging Countries 2.1 2.4 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.0 6.7
Total 25.8 19.6 21.9 3.7 9.0 11.2 91.2
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Table 4: Year 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.3306*** 0.6235*** 0.0242 0.1035**
(0.099) (0.108) (0.038) (0.051)
Log distance -0.1734 -0.8395*** -0.6646***
(0.150) (0.078) (0.085)
Time difference -0.0502* 0.0847*** 0.0141
(0.028) (0.015) (0.017)
Common language 0.3713** 0.1739 0.1947** 0.4491***
(0.174) (0.175) (0.098) (0.106)
Colony dummy 0.4653* 0.5808** 0.2257 0.4550***
(0.267) (0.266) (0.165) (0.164)
Tax treaty 0.0335 0.0768 -0.1179 -0.0880
(0.132) (0.132) (0.081) (0.085)
Currency union dummy 0.1190 -0.1251 0.7517*** 0.1726
(0.224) (0.229) (0.165) (0.158)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP 0.1896 0.3788* 0.0701 0.3340***
(0.207) (0.203) (0.118) (0.127)
Correl. in stock returns 2.6284*** 3.7279***
(0.593) (0.795)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.5543** -0.2242
(0.221) (0.912)
Common legal origin 0.2208* -0.0739
(0.129) (0.130)
Freedom in the host country 0.1574*** 0.1517*** 0.1468*** 0.1727***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010)
Constant -9.3853*** -13.5887*** -2.3249*** -5.0212***
(1.521) (1.105) (0.826) (0.915)
Observations 861 713 1,702 1,702
R-squared 0.878 0.891 0.795 0.505
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.4168*** 0.3868*** -0.0279 0.1266**
(0.094) (0.079) (0.036) (0.050)
Log distance 0.1051 -0.5228*** -0.3962***
(0.146) (0.079) (0.093)
Time difference -0.0229 0.0275* 0.0150
(0.027) (0.015) (0.018)
Common language 0.4734*** 0.2334 0.2982*** 0.3928***
(0.166) (0.152) (0.089) (0.107)
Colony dummy 0.0609 0.2981 0.3435** 0.3942**
(0.251) (0.227) (0.139) (0.159)
Tax treaty -0.1320 -0.0559 -0.1975*** -0.1904**
(0.127) (0.113) (0.072) (0.084)
Currency union dummy 0.5246*** 0.3839* 0.1844 0.2166
(0.201) (0.198) (0.137) (0.146)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.1890 0.0065 0.0289 0.0206
(0.199) (0.179) (0.110) (0.131)
Correl. in stock returns 0.9410 1.1210
(0.599) (0.743)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.1632 0.0770
(0.220) (0.908)
Common legal origin 0.2363* 0.1421
(0.122) (0.120)
Freedom in the host country 0.2143*** 0.2179*** 0.1873*** 0.1879***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant -16.4221*** -15.8411*** -6.4588*** -8.2533***
(1.542) (0.843) (0.770) (0.955)
Observations 685 553 1,219 1,219
R-squared 0.906 0.926 0.906 0.567
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade -0.0234 1.7029*** 0.0789 0.2712***
(0.345) (0.419) (0.048) (0.087)
Log distance -1.5258*** -0.0665 -0.3278**
(0.549) (0.105) (0.155)
Time difference -0.0966 -0.0470** -0.0282
(0.086) (0.019) (0.025)
Common language 0.4079 -0.0773 -0.0571 0.1305
(0.511) (0.568) (0.125) (0.167)
Colony dummy 1.8632** 0.8779 1.0340*** 0.9527***
(0.818) (0.886) (0.248) (0.283)
Tax treaty 0.5327 -0.0321 0.0422 0.0989
(0.402) (0.444) (0.107) (0.145)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.0747 -0.0761 0.1947 0.3658*
(0.831) (0.900) (0.159) (0.214)
Correl. in stock returns 0.5822 5.6551*
(1.806) (2.917)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -1.5347 0.3453
(0.979) (1.997)
Common legal origin 0.6566 -0.4879
(0.405) (0.468)
Freedom in the host country 0.1352** -0.0238 0.0578*** 0.0557***
(0.067) (0.084) (0.011) (0.016)
Constant -1.9341 -9.2153* -9.2420*** -7.7143***
(5.566) (5.484) (1.155) (1.573)
Observations 176 160 483 483
R-squared 0.830 0.811 0.780 0.520
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001) 18
Table 5: Year 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.4162*** 0.7617*** 0.0609 0.1615***
(0.104) (0.117) (0.043) (0.055)
Log distance -0.1174 -0.7684*** -0.7165***
(0.155) (0.087) (0.096)
Time difference -0.0774*** 0.0662*** 0.0366**
(0.028) (0.017) (0.018)
Common language 0.3106* 0.1663 0.2086* 0.3951***
(0.175) (0.192) (0.108) (0.120)
Colony dummy 0.5999** 0.6665** 0.3874** 0.7702***
(0.269) (0.289) (0.175) (0.183)
Tax treaty -0.0048 0.0619 -0.0976 0.0308
(0.139) (0.150) (0.085) (0.094)
Currency union dummy 0.1851 -0.0814 0.8085*** 0.4768***
(0.221) (0.241) (0.172) (0.171)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP 0.2530 0.4340** -0.0463 0.2229*
(0.197) (0.218) (0.117) (0.129)
Correl. in stock returns 1.6040** 2.6438**
(0.665) (1.038)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.3043 -0.8312
(0.237) (0.860)
Common legal origin 0.4004*** 0.2331
(0.130) (0.147)
Freedom in the host country 0.3800*** 0.1318*** 0.1444*** 0.1719***
(0.035) (0.023) (0.009) (0.011)
Constant -27.3493*** -12.8903*** -3.7271*** -5.5259***
(1.902) (1.345) (0.974) (1.128)
Observations 838 706 1,752 1,752
R-squared 0.874 0.869 0.769 0.478
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.4859*** 0.6793*** 0.1387*** 0.3013***
(0.098) (0.100) (0.044) (0.056)
Log distance 0.0126 -0.5455*** -0.4306***
(0.145) (0.094) (0.103)
Time difference -0.0363 0.0363** 0.0295
(0.027) (0.018) (0.020)
Common language 0.4397*** 0.2155 0.3699*** 0.4265***
(0.161) (0.176) (0.103) (0.120)
Colony dummy 0.1751 0.2754 0.2289 0.5410***
(0.241) (0.258) (0.155) (0.171)
Tax treaty -0.1124 -0.0844 -0.1978** -0.0684
(0.127) (0.134) (0.080) (0.090)
Currency union dummy 0.6704*** 0.6491*** -0.0780 0.3798**
(0.192) (0.216) (0.152) (0.154)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.0461 0.0615 0.0165 -0.0002
(0.182) (0.199) (0.116) (0.131)
Correl. in stock returns -0.2876 -1.8099*
(0.646) (1.056)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.0474 0.4697
(0.228) (0.815)
Common legal origin 0.2752** 0.1852
(0.119) (0.137)
Freedom in the host country 0.3329*** 0.2048*** 0.1877*** 0.1957***
(0.026) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011)
Constant -24.3458*** -15.1709*** -8.0066*** -9.9832***
(1.440) (1.071) (0.977) (1.154)
Observations 653 531 1,205 1,205
R-squared 0.912 0.906 0.893 0.579
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1912 1.5665*** 0.0537
(0.348) (0.422) (0.055)
Log distance -1.1795** -0.0403
(0.586) (0.116)
Time difference -0.1137 -0.0696***
(0.096) (0.020)
Common language 0.6224 0.0997 0.1073
(0.531) (0.585) (0.141)
Colony dummy 2.1015** 1.4470 1.3656***
(0.861) (0.877) (0.273)
Tax treaty 0.0304 -0.4540 -0.0905
(0.451) (0.482) (0.118)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP 1.0727 1.1699 0.0679
(0.883) (0.947) (0.152)
Correl. in stock returns 1.3908 7.2659*
(2.293) (3.775)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.8449 -0.8618
(0.956) (2.268)
Common legal origin 0.5086 -0.0233
(0.417) (0.470)
Freedom in the host country 0.2462*** 0.0422 0.0566**
(0.091) (0.080) (0.026)
Constant -12.1723* -13.2368** -9.1677***
(6.652) (5.388) (2.054)
Observations 185 175 547
R-squared 0.796 0.779 0.692
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001) 19
Table 6: Year 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.4661*** 0.7371*** 0.0357
(0.095) (0.112) (0.036)
Log distance -0.0598 -0.7664***
(0.146) (0.075)
Time difference -0.0468* 0.0590***
(0.026) (0.015)
Common language 0.2598* 0.1117 0.2347**
(0.157) (0.162) (0.091)
Colony dummy 0.2819 0.3767 0.2486
(0.252) (0.256) (0.157)
Tax treaty 0.0504 0.1073 -0.1624**
(0.138) (0.138) (0.077)
Currency union dummy 0.2962 0.1605 0.6152***
(0.203) (0.209) (0.152)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP 0.0541 0.1723 0.1830*
(0.163) (0.176) (0.096)
Correl. in stock returns 1.5809** 1.0516
(0.650) (1.097)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.2876 0.4029
(0.237) (0.443)
Common legal origin 0.3640*** 0.1990
(0.118) (0.130)
Freedom in the host country 0.1796*** 0.1481*** 0.1936***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant -12.4329*** -12.8113*** -6.7336***
(1.392) (0.999) (0.940)
Observations 945 812 2,149
R-squared 0.887 0.888 0.783
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.4434*** 0.5577*** 0.0957**
(0.089) (0.100) (0.037)
Log distance 0.0940 -0.5088***
(0.136) (0.084)
Time difference -0.0357 0.0260
(0.025) (0.017)
Common language 0.3057** 0.1515 0.2336***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.088)
Colony dummy -0.0515 0.0648 0.2361
(0.226) (0.220) (0.144)
Tax treaty -0.1486 -0.0878 -0.1381*
(0.127) (0.123) (0.074)
Currency union dummy 0.5137*** 0.4620*** -0.2287*
(0.177) (0.176) (0.139)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.0894 0.0316 0.3269***
(0.150) (0.155) (0.094)
Correl. in stock returns -0.0720 -1.4431
(0.643) (1.156)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.3616 -0.6455
(0.231) (0.392)
Common legal origin 0.3512*** 0.2918**
(0.107) (0.115)
Freedom in the host country 0.4690*** 0.1954*** 0.2142***
(0.031) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant -34.9817*** -13.1577*** -9.7160***
(1.543) (0.805) (0.912)
Observations 737 613 1,571
R-squared 0.921 0.921 0.884
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.0291 1.6076*** 0.0515
(0.310) (0.387) (0.052)
Log distance -0.9311* -0.1068
(0.531) (0.118)
Time difference -0.1581* -0.0708***
(0.087) (0.020)
Common language 0.7849 0.7725 0.0777
(0.496) (0.570) (0.137)
Colony dummy 1.9949** 1.2394 1.0391***
(0.791) (0.875) (0.262)
Tax treaty 0.5127 0.4211 -0.0707
(0.437) (0.488) (0.117)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.1632 -0.0890 -0.0148
(0.771) (0.912) (0.145)
Correl. in stock returns -0.0536 -0.4369
(2.128) (3.642)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.5129 4.2035*
(1.004) (2.312)
Common legal origin 0.4880 -0.2311
(0.382) (0.447)
Freedom in the host country 0.3232*** 0.0293 0.0736***
(0.087) (0.101) (0.027)
Constant -23.0263*** -14.7201** -9.5031***
(6.513) (7.168) (2.115)
Observations 208 199 578
R-squared 0.802 0.750 0.706
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001) 20
Table 7: Year 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.3584*** 0.6519*** 0.0141
(0.090) (0.093) (0.034)
Log distance 0.0585 -0.7234***
(0.139) (0.070)
Time difference -0.0981*** 0.0561***
(0.024) (0.014)
Common language 0.3553** 0.2379 0.1813**
(0.153) (0.156) (0.085)
Colony dummy 0.5243** 0.5312** 0.2980*
(0.242) (0.248) (0.156)
Tax treaty 0.0794 0.1694 -0.0183
(0.136) (0.136) (0.075)
Currency union dummy 0.3882* 0.4043** 0.8027***
(0.199) (0.200) (0.151)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP 0.0645 0.1009 0.2311**
(0.161) (0.168) (0.094)
Correl. in stock returns 1.4197** 0.8976
(0.620) (0.907)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.0170 0.4032
(0.231) (0.377)
Common legal origin 0.3646*** 0.2381**
(0.113) (0.119)
Freedom in the host country 0.2098*** 0.1784*** 0.1917***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant -14.6276*** -14.6393*** -7.3998***
(1.346) (0.857) (0.935)
Observations 1,009 883 2,280
R-squared 0.880 0.885 0.768
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.2929*** 0.4756*** 0.1346***
(0.087) (0.088) (0.036)
Log distance 0.0638 -0.3412***
(0.132) (0.079)
Time difference -0.0598** 0.0095
(0.024) (0.015)
Common language 0.4159*** 0.2702* 0.2329***
(0.144) (0.141) (0.081)
Colony dummy 0.0820 0.1343 0.1491
(0.219) (0.215) (0.139)
Tax treaty -0.0442 0.0868 -0.1982***
(0.130) (0.124) (0.074)
Currency union dummy 0.6319*** 0.7148*** -0.0707
(0.176) (0.171) (0.134)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.0769 -0.1354 0.2275**
(0.153) (0.152) (0.093)
Correl. in stock returns 0.1782 -0.5625
(0.629) (1.027)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.7894*** -0.7003**
(0.233) (0.330)
Common legal origin 0.3834*** 0.3277***
(0.106) (0.108)
Freedom in the host country 0.2467*** 0.2348*** 0.2023***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant -16.4351*** -16.5112*** -10.8151***
(1.274) (0.799) (0.871)
Observations 754 642 1,519
R-squared 0.912 0.916 0.893
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1738 1.4530*** 0.0321
(0.247) (0.264) (0.043)
Log distance -0.3992 -0.0855
(0.470) (0.099)
Time difference -0.1665** -0.0685***
(0.069) (0.018)
Common language 0.5741 0.6561 0.0186
(0.433) (0.471) (0.115)
Colony dummy 2.1697*** 1.3911* 1.4782***
(0.723) (0.782) (0.242)
Tax treaty 0.4310 0.2137 0.0175
(0.365) (0.398) (0.099)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP 0.4821 0.6680 0.0144
(0.543) (0.606) (0.122)
Correl. in stock returns 1.2298 -1.3172
(1.676) (2.281)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 1.1885 3.8755**
(0.795) (1.750)
Common legal origin 0.3057 -0.1907
(0.310) (0.345)
Freedom in the host country 0.1904*** 0.0798* 0.0778***
(0.048) (0.043) (0.025)
Constant -17.2515*** -18.4813*** -10.0855***
(3.563) (3.193) (1.954)
Observations 255 241 761
R-squared 0.802 0.768 0.665
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001) 21
Table 8: Year 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.2899*** 0.8006*** 0.0701**
(0.090) (0.088) (0.031)
Log distance -0.1441 -0.6599***
(0.141) (0.067)
Time difference -0.0982*** 0.0459***
(0.025) (0.013)
Common language 0.3058* 0.2790* 0.1835**
(0.158) (0.163) (0.080)
Colony dummy 0.3310 0.1038 0.4456***
(0.253) (0.259) (0.153)
Tax treaty 0.4234*** 0.4834*** -0.1244*
(0.141) (0.142) (0.072)
Currency union dummy 0.4500** 0.2991 0.6067***
(0.206) (0.210) (0.142)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.1402 0.0189 0.3654***
(0.168) (0.176) (0.085)
Correl. in stock returns 1.0510* 0.4417
(0.627) (0.804)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.1126 -0.3131
(0.240) (0.456)
Common legal origin 0.5060*** 0.3172***
(0.117) (0.122)
Freedom in the host country 0.2169*** 0.1668*** 0.1832***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Constant -13.1043*** -14.9854*** -7.5956***
(1.401) (0.839) (0.814)
Observations 1,020 1,001 2,314
R-squared 0.880 0.877 0.797
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.2907*** 0.5525*** 0.0740** 0.2522***
(0.094) (0.088) (0.031) (0.047)
Log distance -0.0667 -0.4698*** -0.3407***
(0.146) (0.072) (0.093)
Time difference -0.0504* 0.0315** 0.0106
(0.028) (0.014) (0.019)
Common language 0.3186** 0.3269** 0.1933** 0.3781***
(0.160) (0.163) (0.077) (0.104)
Colony dummy -0.0060 -0.1125 0.3232** 0.4099**
(0.245) (0.244) (0.139) (0.166)
Tax treaty 0.1148 0.1935 -0.1069 -0.0129
(0.145) (0.143) (0.071) (0.091)
Currency union dummy 0.7537*** 0.7645*** 0.0102 0.2514*
(0.193) (0.198) (0.129) (0.142)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.2318 -0.2040 0.2541*** 0.1633
(0.172) (0.171) (0.088) (0.107)
Correl. in stock returns -0.3084 -1.0299
(0.672) (0.875)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.9122*** -0.6030
(0.263) (0.511)
Common legal origin 0.3892*** 0.2579**
(0.117) (0.120)
Freedom in the host country 0.2507*** 0.2303*** 0.2040*** 0.1929***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010)
Constant -15.5273*** -16.6838*** -9.7894*** -10.6346***
(1.431) (0.796) (0.818) (0.989)
Observations 751 735 1,649 1,649
R-squared 0.904 0.905 0.895 0.571
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1318 1.3029*** 0.1120**
(0.204) (0.206) (0.051)
Log distance -0.9979** -0.1173
(0.391) (0.111)
Time difference -0.0824 -0.0742***
(0.058) (0.020)
Common language 0.2822 0.0554 0.1502
(0.388) (0.417) (0.129)
Colony dummy 1.8029*** 1.3465** 1.4101***
(0.628) (0.672) (0.276)
Tax treaty 1.0901*** 0.7468** -0.0944
(0.318) (0.347) (0.115)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.0879 0.1606 -0.1085
(0.477) (0.515) (0.130)
Correl. in stock returns 1.3068 1.9397
(1.397) (1.810)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.3780 0.4628
(0.690) (1.256)
Common legal origin 0.6823** 0.3828
(0.276) (0.303)
Freedom in the host country 0.1788*** 0.0527 0.1002***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.028)
Constant -10.4018*** -14.5643*** -10.5045***
(2.955) (2.116) (2.122)
Observations 269 266 665
R-squared 0.839 0.813 0.682
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001) 22
Table 9: Year 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.2701*** 0.9244*** 0.0467* 0.3196***
(0.085) (0.083) (0.027) (0.040)
Log distance -0.3527*** -0.7342*** -0.4931***
(0.133) (0.061) (0.073)
Time difference -0.0756*** 0.0586*** 0.0116
(0.024) (0.012) (0.014)
Common language 0.1607 0.1415 0.1600** 0.3414***
(0.151) (0.159) (0.078) (0.089)
Colony dummy 0.5546** 0.2875 0.4531*** 0.4590***
(0.243) (0.250) (0.145) (0.148)
Tax treaty 0.4189*** 0.4143*** 0.0084 0.0192
(0.135) (0.138) (0.068) (0.078)
Currency union dummy 0.5070** 0.4498** 0.8125*** 0.2539*
(0.199) (0.205) (0.139) (0.138)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.2073 -0.0539 0.3158*** 0.3819***
(0.156) (0.166) (0.078) (0.085)
Correl. in stock returns 1.0020 0.1356
(0.618) (0.734)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.0300 -0.2667
(0.237) (0.427)
Common legal origin 0.3467*** 0.1198
(0.111) (0.117)
Freedom in the host country 0.2165*** 0.1584*** 0.1798*** 0.2032***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Constant -11.1202*** -14.9162*** -5.7638*** -11.0984***
(1.362) (0.802) (0.830) (1.025)
Observations 1,061 1,040 2,504 2,504
R-squared 0.883 0.877 0.796 0.506
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3752*** 0.5291*** 0.1022*** 0.3525***
(0.083) (0.077) (0.028) (0.042)
Log distance -0.1558 -0.5437*** -0.2718***
(0.128) (0.066) (0.083)
Time difference 0.0010 0.0311** 0.0142
(0.025) (0.013) (0.017)
Common language 0.1822 0.2223 0.1454** 0.2239**
(0.141) (0.143) (0.074) (0.092)
Colony dummy 0.2538 0.2237 0.4025*** 0.4310***
(0.214) (0.213) (0.125) (0.142)
Tax treaty 0.1654 0.2062 -0.1272* -0.1309
(0.130) (0.128) (0.067) (0.082)
Currency union dummy 0.7763*** 0.8284*** -0.0263 0.2129*
(0.171) (0.172) (0.120) (0.129)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.1220 -0.1210 0.2157*** 0.0890
(0.151) (0.151) (0.081) (0.096)
Correl. in stock returns -0.0349 -0.4359
(0.607) (0.706)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.6767*** -0.7532**
(0.238) (0.380)
Common legal origin 0.1917* 0.1076
(0.103) (0.105)
Freedom in the host country 0.2341*** 0.2254*** 0.2232*** 0.2401***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
Constant -14.9243*** -16.6011*** -10.1492*** -15.5139***
(1.315) (0.700) (0.784) (1.092)
Observations 778 760 1,653 1,653
R-squared 0.918 0.920 0.910 0.579
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.0539 1.5358*** 0.0870**
(0.220) (0.215) (0.038)
Log distance -1.3600*** -0.1868*
(0.397) (0.096)
Time difference -0.0780 -0.0778***
(0.062) (0.018)
Common language 0.1129 -0.2263 0.3029**
(0.411) (0.450) (0.124)
Colony dummy 1.7502** 0.8833 1.1886***
(0.729) (0.787) (0.274)
Tax treaty 1.0340*** 0.7007* -0.1236
(0.333) (0.371) (0.101)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP 0.0510 0.3880 -0.0721
(0.494) (0.532) (0.115)
Correl. in stock returns 1.7714 1.2479
(1.583) (1.937)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.5338 1.0670
(0.732) (1.595)
Common legal origin 0.3758 -0.0096
(0.292) (0.321)
Freedom in the host country 0.1705*** 0.0133 0.0747***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.015)
Constant -9.0083*** -11.2667*** -9.1996***
(3.365) (2.850) (1.469)
Observations 283 280 851
R-squared 0.805 0.768 0.635
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001) 23
Table 10: Year 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.3839*** 0.8194*** 0.0595** 0.2575***
(0.085) (0.084) (0.026) (0.040)
Log distance -0.0112 -0.6663*** -0.5236***
(0.134) (0.059) (0.075)
Time difference -0.1112*** 0.0432*** 0.0171
(0.024) (0.012) (0.014)
Common language 0.4859*** 0.4608*** 0.2482*** 0.3683***
(0.153) (0.156) (0.071) (0.091)
Colony dummy 0.6103** 0.4061* 0.5027*** 0.5720***
(0.242) (0.246) (0.133) (0.149)
Tax treaty 0.4028*** 0.4182*** 0.0038 0.1748**
(0.137) (0.138) (0.064) (0.079)
Currency union dummy 0.4241** 0.3123 0.4444*** 0.2810**
(0.203) (0.206) (0.132) (0.141)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.1140 -0.0469 0.3481*** 0.3161***
(0.157) (0.162) (0.072) (0.086)
Correl. in stock returns 1.1834* 0.7745
(0.615) (0.690)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.0863 -0.3465
(0.242) (0.462)
Common legal origin 0.1288 -0.0604
(0.112) (0.116)
Freedom in the host country 0.2399*** 0.1942*** 0.1860*** 0.2038***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010)
Constant -17.1033*** -17.6911*** -8.0023*** -11.1694***
Observations 1,098 1,098 2,640 2,640
R-squared 0.879 0.874 0.803 0.490
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3780*** 0.4170*** 0.0769*** 0.3127***
(0.080) (0.076) (0.028) (0.044)
Log distance -0.0779 -0.4523*** -0.2642***
(0.123) (0.067) (0.086)
Time difference 0.0132 0.0281** 0.0230
(0.024) (0.013) (0.017)
Common language 0.4197*** 0.4291*** 0.2411*** 0.3295***
(0.138) (0.139) (0.073) (0.098)
Colony dummy 0.1914 0.1805 0.4847*** 0.5593***
(0.207) (0.207) (0.127) (0.149)
Tax treaty 0.0854 0.0698 -0.0766 0.1226
(0.129) (0.127) (0.068) (0.085)
Currency union dummy 0.7553*** 0.7640*** -0.2097* 0.2192
(0.168) (0.168) (0.124) (0.134)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.1108 -0.0980 0.2280*** 0.0983
(0.149) (0.149) (0.082) (0.100)
Correl. in stock returns 0.6675 0.5288
(0.590) (0.647)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.3428 -0.3618
(0.235) (0.404)
Common legal origin 0.0897 0.0821
(0.101) (0.103)
Freedom in the host country 0.2417*** 0.2407*** 0.2207*** 0.2313***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
Constant -16.9970*** -17.7180*** -11.7857*** -15.4801***
Observations 791 791 1,808 1,808
R-squared 0.921 0.920 0.892 0.577
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3442 1.8054*** 0.1223***
(0.235) (0.262) (0.043)
Log distance -0.6778 -0.1686*
(0.417) (0.101)
Time difference -0.1800*** -0.0875***
(0.066) (0.019)
Common language 0.8659** 0.7317 0.2266*
(0.431) (0.473) (0.124)
Colony dummy 1.9580*** 1.1457 1.0296***
(0.724) (0.792) (0.249)
Tax treaty 0.6330* 0.3559 -0.0941
(0.351) (0.397) (0.102)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP 0.0710 0.8517 0.0782
(0.529) (0.580) (0.119)
Correl. in stock returns 0.9361 -1.6053
(1.692) (2.096)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.2058 3.2853
(0.868) (2.157)
Common legal origin -0.0021 -0.5083
(0.299) (0.334)
Freedom in the host country 0.2332*** 0.1581** 0.0557***
(0.067) (0.073) (0.019)
Constant -21.4053*** -21.2140*** -6.9054***
Observations 307 307 832
R-squared 0.791 0.744 0.684
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
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Table 11: Year 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.2984*** 0.8923*** 0.0550**
(0.098) (0.089) (0.027)
Log distance -0.2819* -0.7089***
(0.150) (0.064)
Time difference -0.0805*** 0.0617***
(0.027) (0.013)
Common language 0.0797 0.0608 0.2817***
(0.172) (0.177) (0.079)
Colony dummy 0.5036* 0.3284 0.4917***
(0.269) (0.273) (0.148)
Tax treaty 0.2702 0.3027* -0.1423**
(0.166) (0.167) (0.069)
Currency union dummy 0.4657** 0.3174 0.5238***
(0.224) (0.230) (0.141)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.0737 0.0107 0.5053***
(0.174) (0.180) (0.077)
Correl. in stock returns 1.1128 0.6539
(0.784) (0.881)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.2344 0.4908
(0.299) (0.507)
Common legal origin 0.3440*** 0.0812
(0.127) (0.133)
Freedom in the host country 0.2419*** 0.1883*** 0.1776***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.012)
Constant -14.3707*** -17.7506*** -7.2943***
(1.572) (1.084) (0.836)
Observations 915 915 2,207
R-squared 0.882 0.876 0.792
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1534 0.5111*** 0.0414
(0.098) (0.087) (0.031)
Log distance -0.4442*** -0.5591***
(0.156) (0.076)
Time difference 0.0222 0.0297**
(0.030) (0.014)
Common language 0.1660 0.1787 0.2104**
(0.175) (0.177) (0.084)
Colony dummy -0.0463 -0.1366 0.5469***
(0.257) (0.259) (0.142)
Tax treaty 0.0126 -0.0421 -0.1033
(0.181) (0.179) (0.077)
Currency union dummy 0.7972*** 0.7693*** -0.2227*
(0.201) (0.205) (0.132)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.0985 -0.0679 0.3439***
(0.180) (0.182) (0.088)
Correl. in stock returns 0.0875 -0.1198
(0.860) (0.967)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.3838 0.1645
(0.312) (0.468)
Common legal origin 0.2658** 0.1518
(0.127) (0.130)
Freedom in the host country 0.2625*** 0.2339*** 0.2179***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.013)
Constant -13.2398*** -17.5053*** -10.5045***
(1.572) (0.990) (0.877)
Observations 652 652 1,430
R-squared 0.911 0.908 0.891
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.5672** 1.7597*** 0.1272***
(0.264) (0.263) (0.038)
Log distance -0.4292 -0.1235
(0.409) (0.096)
Time difference -0.1473** -0.0682***
(0.071) (0.018)
Common language -0.3748 -0.4205 0.4418***
(0.418) (0.437) (0.114)
Colony dummy 2.1288*** 1.8365** 0.9180***
(0.692) (0.736) (0.259)
Tax treaty 0.3625 0.0572 -0.2660***
(0.394) (0.429) (0.099)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.2785 0.1635 0.0977
(0.609) (0.625) (0.113)
Correl. in stock returns 0.6321 0.8016
(1.834) (2.182)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.6639 -0.5080
(1.007) (2.058)
Common legal origin 0.3638 -0.1150
(0.311) (0.336)
Freedom in the host country 0.2574*** 0.1456** 0.1143***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.018)
Constant -22.3106*** -22.4495*** -11.2831***
(4.760) (4.687) (1.596)
Observations 263 263 777
R-squared 0.808 0.788 0.683
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001) 25
Table 12: Year 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.4026*** 0.7348*** 0.0967*** 0.2683***
(0.102) (0.082) (0.033) (0.047)
Log distance -0.1423 -0.5763*** -0.4292***
(0.148) (0.074) (0.086)
Time difference -0.0560** 0.0340** 0.0098
(0.028) (0.015) (0.017)
Common language 0.2519 0.2434 0.3110*** 0.4717***
(0.169) (0.170) (0.093) (0.105)
Colony dummy 0.7584** 0.6345** 0.6141*** 0.6791***
(0.298) (0.296) (0.175) (0.184)
Tax treaty 0.2371 0.2453 -0.1142 0.1135
(0.167) (0.165) (0.083) (0.093)
Currency union dummy 0.6166*** 0.5457** 0.5015*** 0.3431**
(0.219) (0.221) (0.154) (0.155)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.2455 -0.2228 0.4738*** 0.4396***
(0.178) (0.180) (0.089) (0.096)
Correl. in stock returns 3.2647*** 2.8809***
(0.860) (0.982)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.3918 0.2662
(0.359) (0.466)
Common legal origin 0.1094 -0.0368
(0.128) (0.129)
Freedom in the host country 0.1631*** 0.1421*** 0.2046*** 0.2482***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.009) (0.013)
Constant -11.2190*** -13.6829*** -9.4660*** -14.5717***
(1.712) (1.180) (0.907) (1.277)
Observations 863 863 1,983 1,983
R-squared 0.883 0.881 0.804 0.477
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3049*** 0.3389*** 0.0625 0.3171***
(0.089) (0.074) (0.038) (0.054)
Log distance -0.1439 -0.5796*** -0.3224***
(0.129) (0.092) (0.104)
Time difference 0.0398 0.0353* 0.0329
(0.027) (0.019) (0.021)
Common language 0.2195 0.2478* 0.2428** 0.2361**
(0.146) (0.146) (0.104) (0.119)
Colony dummy 0.0828 0.0657 0.5981*** 0.7269***
(0.244) (0.242) (0.181) (0.188)
Tax treaty 0.0535 0.0220 -0.0175 0.1864*
(0.157) (0.155) (0.100) (0.109)
Currency union dummy 0.8581*** 0.8894*** 0.0336 0.2176
(0.173) (0.175) (0.160) (0.153)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.1693 -0.1533 0.4553*** 0.2364**
(0.159) (0.158) (0.111) (0.117)
Correl. in stock returns 2.2800*** 1.8032**
(0.785) (0.898)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.1290 0.3574
(0.362) (0.479)
Common legal origin 0.1342 0.1405
(0.110) (0.110)
Freedom in the host country 0.1634*** 0.1697*** 0.1792*** 0.1852***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant -10.7404*** -12.1241*** -6.6766*** -10.5513***
(1.458) (0.945) (0.985) (1.129)
Observations 626 626 1,343 1,343
R-squared 0.923 0.922 0.866 0.556
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.7951*** 1.5162*** 0.1256**
(0.291) (0.264) (0.053)
Log distance -0.6409 -0.1424
(0.475) (0.115)
Time difference -0.0403 -0.0861***
(0.076) (0.021)
Common language 0.2017 0.1179 0.3751**
(0.480) (0.482) (0.149)
Colony dummy 2.6578*** 2.1711** 1.3271***
(0.875) (0.874) (0.328)
Tax treaty 0.1666 -0.0289 -0.0356
(0.414) (0.439) (0.121)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP 0.2792 0.4289 0.0394
(0.583) (0.590) (0.131)
Correl. in stock returns 4.3541* 4.8537*
(2.331) (2.731)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -1.5450 -1.7473
(1.198) (1.885)
Common legal origin -0.3528 -0.4616
(0.356) (0.356)
Freedom in the host country 0.1741*** 0.1148* 0.1161***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.031)
Constant -17.9775*** -25.5616*** -12.0097***
(5.087) (4.543) (2.346)
Observations 237 237 640
R-squared 0.797 0.790 0.713
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001) 26
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Table 16: 2001-2009 Panel estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Panel FE Panel FE Tobit Tobit Probit Probit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.2861*** 0.3185*** 0.7586*** 0.7754*** 0.0457*** 0.0469***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.2972*** -0.3309*** -0.2715*** -0.1924*** -0.0073 -0.0011
(0.086) (0.087) (0.051) (0.050) (0.009) (0.009)
Tax treaty 0.0061 0.0034 0.2949*** 0.3860*** 0.0987*** 0.1004***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.038) (0.038) (0.006) (0.006)
Correl. in stock returns -0.7227** -0.7632*** 5.1106*** 4.3438*** 0.4401*** 0.3837***
(0.282) (0.281) (0.096) (0.103) (0.016) (0.016)
Correl. growth-stock return 0.2148 0.2235* 0.1051* 0.1910*** -0.0300*** -0.0252***
(0.132) (0.132) (0.055) (0.054) (0.007) (0.007)
Freedom in the host country 0.0279*** 0.0327*** 0.0024***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant -5.7550*** -7.7373*** -8.5580*** -10.4575***
(0.184) (0.492) (0.065) (0.131)
Observations 10835 10835 13229 13229 13438 13438
R-squared 0.094 0.097 0.219 0.225 0.343 0.348
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3069*** 0.3229*** 0.7664*** 0.7945*** 0.0217*** 0.0220***
(0.060) (0.059) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.1574** -0.1813** -0.1492*** -0.0666 0.0020 0.0032
(0.079) (0.081) (0.058) (0.056) (0.007) (0.007)
Tax treaty 0.0897 0.0874 0.0750 0.2750*** 0.0446*** 0.0469***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.046) (0.046) (0.005) (0.005)
Correl. in stock returns -0.8968*** -0.9204*** 5.3078*** 4.0995*** 0.2869*** 0.2623***
(0.302) (0.303) (0.105) (0.116) (0.012) (0.013)
Correl. growth-stock return 0.3220** 0.3297** 0.4185*** 0.4714*** -0.0235*** -0.0229***
(0.153) (0.153) (0.059) (0.058) (0.005) (0.005)
Freedom in the host country 0.0119* 0.0433*** 0.0008***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant -4.9823*** -5.8219*** -7.9142*** -10.6443***
(0.208) (0.496) (0.071) (0.146)
Observations 7567 7567 8623 8623 8766 8766
R-squared 0.109 0.110 0.253 0.264 0.363 0.364
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1776 0.2269** 0.6061*** 0.6114*** 0.0967*** 0.1003***
(0.114) (0.114) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.0198 0.1247 -0.5364*** -0.4206*** -0.0336 -0.0063
(0.307) (0.305) (0.067) (0.066) (0.022) (0.022)
Tax treaty -0.2240 -0.2123 -0.1162** -0.1291*** 0.1720*** 0.1558***
(0.224) (0.224) (0.047) (0.046) (0.014) (0.014)
Correl. in stock returns 0.6294 0.4688 2.7916*** 2.2589*** 0.6493*** 0.5280***
(0.559) (0.553) (0.143) (0.145) (0.044) (0.045)
Correl. growth-stock return -0.2281 -0.2965 -0.1713** -0.0042 -0.0126 0.0189
(0.259) (0.261) (0.080) (0.080) (0.021) (0.021)
Freedom in the host country 0.0702*** 0.0325*** 0.0075***
(0.018) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -7.8598*** -12.8549*** -8.4242*** -10.7188***
(0.342) (1.320) (0.096) (0.183)
Observations 3268 3268 4606 4606 4672 4672
R-squared 0.135 0.141 0.195 0.207 0.332 0.349
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated equations: log(xij) = φij + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
Dependent variable in regressions (5) and (6) is a binary variable taking value 1 if xij > 0 and zero otherwise
Columns (5) and (6) report marginal effects
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